Richard Rorty’s Ironists vs. Metaphysicians:

Navigating Private Doubts and Public Hopes

Ryder Richards continues with Rorty’s “Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.”

The liberal ironist, who doubts privately but fights cruelty publicly, does so with ironic (contingent) description, versus the metaphysicians’ truth-chasing. Rorty’s critique of Plato, Kant, Heidegger, Foucault, and Habermas, while championing Nietzsche, Derrida, Dickens, and Proust, is a few examples we will examine. Ryder skeptically probes whether Rorty’s private-public split weakens moral resolve.

Step 87: Rorty’s Ironist vs Metaphysician

Defining the Ironist and Metaphysician:Doubt vs. Dogma

Rorty kicks off Part II by drawing a line in the sand: ironists versus metaphysicians. 

An ironist, he says, meets three conditions: “She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses,” because she’s dazzled by other vocabularies; she knows her current words can’t resolve those doubts; and she doesn’t think her vocabulary is “closer to reality than others” (p. 73). Ironists, channeling Donald Davidson, reject the idea of stepping outside language to check it against reality, and, with Heidegger, they embrace language’s historical contingency. As Rorty puts it, ironists see vocabularies as “tools” for coping, not “bits of a jigsaw puzzle” fitting a pre-existing truth (p. 77).

Metaphysicians, on the other hand, are old-school truth-hunters. They believe in a “final vocabulary” that captures “the way the world is” (p. 75). Rorty skewers their quest, critical of Plato and Kant for assuming “built-in criteria” let us spot the “right” vocabulary (p. 75). He writes, “Metaphysicians think our contemporary vocabularies are close enough to the right one to help us formulate premises leading to the right conclusions” (p. 75). 

For them, “right” means grasping “real essence,” not just what works for “those who speak as we do” (p. 75). 

Rorty’s critique stings: metaphysicians treat alternative vocabularies like puzzle pieces, “reducible, dispensable, or capable of being united into one grand super vocabulary” (p. 76), embracing their pragmatic utility despite it’s blindness and cruelty. 

Example: Rorty takes a swing at traditional philosophy’s obsession with “facts” and “meanings,” arguing they assume language is a “medium” for representing reality (p. 80). He cites Davidson’s attack on the “scheme-content model,” where philosophers like Kant posit a gap between our concepts and raw reality. Rorty quips, “The trouble with arguments against the use of a familiar and time-honored vocabulary is that they are expected to be phrased in that very vocabulary” (p. 78), exposing the logical trap: you can’t disprove a vocabulary using its own terms—it’s like trying to lift yourself by your bootstraps.

Counterexample (Skepticism): Rorty’s ironist sounds liberating, (who doesn’t want to self-create their unique being free of the restrictions that came beofre?) but what if doubting every vocabulary paralyzes action? Take moral crises, like confronting systemic injustice. If I’m an ironist, endlessly questioning my terms—“justice,” “equality”—I might hesitate when decisive action is needed. Philosophers like John Rawls, whom Rorty later praises, offer pri ncipled frameworks (e.g., the “veil of ignorance”) that anchor moral reasoning. Rorty’s dismissal of such frameworks as metaphysician’s dogma risks leaving us adrift, unable to commit when stakes are high.

Key Takeaway: Ironists embrace doubt and treat vocabularies as tools, while metaphysicians chase a final truth. Rorty’s vision is dynamic, but his allergy to universal criteria might weaken our moral resolve.

Step 87: Rorty’s Ironist vs Metaphysician

Ironist vs. Metaphysician Methods: Redescription vs. Resolution

The ironist and metaphysician don’t just differ in outlook—they clash in method. Metaphysicians see philosophy as a quest to “know about certain general and important things” (p. 79), resolving contradictions between beliefs by proposing distinctions, categorizing, and building theories that “converge on the way things really are” (p. 79). Rorty mocks their faith in “uncontroversial premises,” arguing it’s a pipe dream (p. 79). Ironists, by contrast, see theories as “gradual substitutions of a new vocabulary for an old one” (p. 80). They call metaphysicians’ “intuitions” mere “platitudes” and progress as “ ” (p. 80).

Rorty’s ironist method is dialectic—pitting vocabularies against each other, relying on “redescription rather than inference” (p. 80). He writes, “The ironist hopes that by introducing new jargon… people will stop asking questions phrased in the old words” (p. 80). 

Logic, for ironists, is “ancillary to dialectic,” while metaphysicians see dialectic as “mere rhetoric” (p. 80). Rorty’s goal for ironists is _private perfection_—self-creation through redescription, aiming to “become a person who could not have existed before one’s particular vocabulary” (p. 82).

Example: Rorty targets metaphysicians’ obsession with resolving contradictions, like the “place of consciousness in a world of molecules” (p. 76). He argues these are “factitious theoretical quarrels” (p. 77), citing Wittgenstein and Davidson, who ask pragmatic questions: “Does our use of these words get in the way of our use of those other words?” (p. 77). Rorty ridicules philosophers like Descartes for stirring up “difficulties nobody else sees” (p. 77), trapping themselves in logical puzzles that practical tools sidestep. And later he praises Derrida’s ability to bypass logic with narrative fancy. 

Counterexample (Skepticism): Rorty’s dialectic sounds creative, but it risks intellectual anarchy. If we only redescribe without seeking coherence, how do we avoid contradictions that undermine trust? For example, in science, metaphysicians like Popper insist on falsifiability to refine theories, ensuring they align with evidence. Rorty’s ironist, dodging such criteria, might redescribe gravity as “cosmic poetry” and lose predictive power. Without some shared standards, redescription can become whimsical, eroding collective progress.

Key Takeaway: Ironists redescribe to create new selves, while metaphysicians resolve contradictions to uncover truth. Rorty’s method sparks innovation, but without anchors, it risks incoherence.

Step 87: Rorty’s Ironist vs Metaphysician

The Liberal Ironist: Splitting Private and Public

Rorty’s star player is the liberal ironist, who juggles private doubt with public hope. She’s a liberal, per Judith Shklar, believing “cruelty is the worst thing we do” (p. 74), and an ironist, aware her beliefs are contingent. Rorty writes, “The liberal ironist combines a commitment to reducing cruelty with an acknowledgment of the contingency of her own beliefs and desires” (p. 84). Her challenge: the “vocabulary of self-creation is necessarily private, unshared, and unsuited to argument,” while “the vocabulary of justice is necessarily public and shared” (p. 85). Rorty’s solution? Keep them separate: pursue “private perfection” at home, but join the public fight against cruelty.

Rorty warns that irony in public can erode solidarity, making you seem cynical, while liberal hope in private stifles self-creation. He says, “There is no way to bring self-creation together with justice at the level of theory” (p. 85), rejecting Plato’s dream of fusing personal and communal good. His liberal utopia is a society where “irony is universal,” letting citizens be “as privatistic, ‘irrationalist,’ and aestheticist as they please” without harming others (p. 85).

Example of Rorty’s Critique: Rorty dismisses Plato’s attempt to “answer the question ‘Why is it in one’s interest to be just?’” as a metaphysical fantasy (p. xv). He argues it assumes a “common human nature” uniting private and public (p. xv), a notion ironists reject. Plato’s logic, Rorty says, leads to “transparent attempts to make altruism look more reasonable than it is” (p. xv), trapping philosophers in circular arguments about moral duty, much like Kant’s anemic categorical imperative. 

Counterexample (Skepticism): Rorty’s private-public split is appealing and tidy, but it ignores how personal beliefs shape public action. If I’m privately ironic about “justice,” doubting it’s just a word, how do I sincerely fight for it publicly? Think of activists like Martin Luther King Jr., whose public crusade was fueled by a deeply personal, non-ironic faith in universal dignity. Rorty’s firewall might weaken such conviction, splitting the self in ways that dilute commitment.

Key Takeaway: The liberal ironist balances private irony with public anti-cruelty, but Rorty’s split risks fracturing moral integrity.

Step 87: Rorty’s Ironist vs Metaphysician

Exemplars of Irony: Proust, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida

Rorty showcases ironists like Proust, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida, who craft unique selves through private redescription. Proust’s In Search of Lost Time weaves memories into a self that “could not have existed” without his metaphors (p. 99). Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra rejects universal truths, inventing the “overman” with “aphorisms and metaphors” (p. 101). Heidegger’s Being and Time redescribes the self as “Being-in-the-world,” contingent on history (p. 102). Derrida’s deconstruction, in Of Grammatology, plays with language, exposing metaphysics’ shaky binaries like “presence/absence” (p. 107).

Rorty argues these projects are private, not public threats. He writes, “Derrida’s work is best treated as a private project of philosophical play… rather than a public theory” (p. 108). Their irony inspires autonomy without undermining liberal hope, as long as it stays personal.

Example: Rorty chides Habermas, a metaphysician, for being “unwilling to be an ironist,” accusing him of wanting to “rationalize rather than poeticize” (p. 90). He also critiques Foucault, an ironist “unwilling to be a liberal,” whose public authenticity risks prioritizing “a social goal over avoiding cruelty” (p. 90). Rorty exposes their logical bind: Habermas seeks universal foundations, Foucault universal rebellion—both miss the pragmatic middle.

Counterexample (Skepticism): Rorty’s privatization of irony assumes it won’t leak into public life, but history disagrees. Nietzsche’s ideas, meant for private self-creation, inspired public ideologies like fascism, showing how irony can escape containment. Rorty’s neat division underestimates how private vocabularies shape public actions, risking unintended consequences.

Key Takeaway: Ironists like Proust and Derrida inspire private autonomy, but Rorty’s containment strategy overlooks their public ripple effects.

Step 87: Rorty’s Ironist vs Metaphysician

Solidarity and Social Hope – Imagination vs. Essence

Rorty’s liberal ironist redefines solidarity, not as a “common human essence” but as “imaginative identification” with others’ pain (p. 192). He writes, “Solidarity is not discovered by reflection but created” (p. 94), through narratives like Dickens’s Bleak House that detail suffering. Ironists base solidarity on “a common danger”—the “recognition of a common susceptibility to humiliation” (p. 91). Metaphysicians, conversely, seek a universal vocabulary highlighting “a shared power” like rationality or truth (p. 91).

Rorty argues ironists can’t offer metaphysicians’ “social hope” grounded in truth, since “freedom depends on historical contingencies, weapons, and luck” (p. 92). Instead, they use redescription to answer “What humiliates?” (p. 91), expanding “us” to include “them.” 

Example: Rorty critiques Kant’s universalism, arguing it assumes “reason” as a “common core” (p. 196). He says Kant’s focus on “rational respect” over pity makes cruelty seem “second-rate” (p. 196), a logical error that sidelines empathy. Rorty’s jab: Kant’s purity traps him in a “peculiar institution” of morality (p. 197), disconnected from real suffering.

Counterexample (Skepticism): Rorty’s reliance on narrative for solidarity is powerful, because humans love stories, but also fragile. If solidarity hinges on stories, what happens when narratives clash or propaganda drowns out empathy? Kant’s universal principles, though abstract, provide a fallback to judge competing claims. Rorty’s contingency leaves us vulnerable to narrative manipulation, like in Orwell’s 1984.

Key Takeaway: Ironists create solidarity through imagination, but Rorty’s narrative-driven approach risks instability without universal anchors.

Step 87: Rorty’s Ironist vs Metaphysician

Conclusion

Rorty’s Part II paints a vivid clash: ironists, wielding doubt and redescription, versus metaphysicians, chasing universal truths. The liberal ironist is his hero, balancing private self-creation with public anti-cruelty, inspired by figures like Proust and Derrida. Rorty’s prose sparkles, and his critiques of Plato, Kant, and Habermas expose philosophy’s logical knots. As he writes, “Anything could be made to look good or bad… by being redescribed” (p. 7), empowering us to craft new selves and solidarities. But I’m wary: Rorty’s split between private and public feels artificial, and his rejection of universal truths leaves moral action shaky. Can irony sustain commitment when conviction wanes?

Next time, in Step 88, we’ll dive into Part III, exploring cruelty and solidarity through Nabokov and Orwell. I’ll also push back harder, arguing Rorty’s framework might undermine the very hope he champions. Until then, keep questioning your vocabulary.